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Abstract – A Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) is being developed for a steam-methane reforming hydrogen production 
plant linked to a High-Temperature Gas Cooled Nuclear Reactor (HTGR). This work is based on the Japan Atomic Energy 
Research Institute’s (JAERI) High Temperature Test Reactor (HTTR) prototype in Japan. This study has two major 
objectives: calculate the risk to onsite and offsite individuals, and calculate the frequency of different types of damage to the 
complex. A simplified HAZOP study was performed to identify initiating events, based on existing studies. The initiating 
events presented here are methane pipe break, helium pipe break, and PPWC heat exchanger pipe break. Generic data was 
used for the fault tree analysis and the initiating event frequency.  Saphire was used for the PSA analysis. The results show 
that the average frequency of an accident at this complex is 2.5E-06, which is divided into the various end states. The 
dominant sequences result in graphite oxidation which does not pose a health risk to the population. The dominant sequences 
that could affect the population are those that result in a methane explosion and occur 6.6E-8/year, while the other 
sequences are much less frequent. The health risk presents itself if there are people in the vicinity who could be affected by 
the explosion. This analysis also demonstrates that an accident in one of the plants has little effect on the other. This is true 
given the design base distance between the plants, the fact that the reactor is underground, as well as other safety 
characteristics of the HTGR. Sensitivity studies are being performed in order to determine where additional and improved 
data is needed.  
 
  
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Japanese Atomic Energy Research Institute 
(JAERI) is currently building a hydrogen production plant, 
that uses the methane reforming method and its thermal 
energy is provided by a nuclear High Temperature Test 
Reactor (HTTR). Information was gathered from publicly 
available documents in order to describe the systems and 
their components of the HTTR [1] and  P&IDs of the 
plant [2]. Generic failure rates were used in the analysis. 
The chemical plant failure rates are taken from Guidelines 
for Process Equipment Reliability Data with Data Tables,   
[3], and the nuclear component failure rates from the PRA 
Procedure’s Guide [4] and a study on operational 
experience at Fort St. Vrain [5] .  
In a previous study, various initiating events and their, 
possible consequences were identified [6]; with this 
information event trees were constructed for three 
initiating events that could most impact public health. The 
objective of this paper is to present possible accident 
sequences and their frequencies, with more emphasis 
placed on the economic risk of the chemical plant and the 
fact that it is coupled to an HTTR. With the event trees, it 
is possible to define different end states and not all result 
in explosion. With this information it was possible to 
determine the components that contribute most to the 
accidents and perform various sensitivity studies in order 
to determine how to reduce the frequency of the events. 
 
II. Description of the Complex 
 
It is necessary to fully understand the design of the 
plants that constitute the complex and their safety systems 
in order to be able to develop the event trees and reflect in 
them the chronology of the actuation of the mitigating 
systems. Complete knowledge about the components of 
the safety systems is also crucial to the development of 
the fault trees and data base. Given the limited 
information available, assumptions were made when 
necessary and are indicated as such throughout the paper. 
 
II.A. Main HTTR Systems 
 
One of the main characteristics of HTTR safety is the 
fuel design, which consists of coated fuel particles 
(CFP’s) that should not fail during normal operation and 
anticipated operational occurrences (AOO’s). Among the 
safety characteristics of the reactor are the following: the 
maximum fuel temperature does not exceed 1600°C in 
any AOO. The reactor will be shut down in a safe and 
reliable way during operation using a control rod system. 
In addition, the Reserve Shutdown System (RSS) is 
independent of the control rod system. Another system is 
designed to remove decay heat after reactor shutdown for 
any AOO or accident. The HTTR has a containment 
vessel to prevent a release of fission products (FP’s) and 
an excessive ingress of air in the case of a 
depressurization accident. The pressure in the Pressurized 
Water Cooling System (PWCS) will be controlled and 
will have less pressure than that of the primary helium to 
prevent a large ingress of water into the core in case of a 
heat exchanger tube rupture in the Pressurized Primary 
Water Cooler (PPWC). The pressure of the helium in the 
Secondary Helium Cooling System (SHCS) will be 
slightly higher than the primary to prevent release of 
fission products, from the Primary Cooling System (PCS) 
to the secondary, through a break in the heat exchanger 
(IHX) pipe.  
 
 
II.B. Description of the Chemical Plant 
II.B.1. Description of the Methane Reforming Process. 
 
The most efficient and economic way to generate 
hydrogen is by the methane reforming process, although 
the use of this method generates carbon dioxide, the 
production of this greenhouse gas is reduced by almost 
22% [6] when using a nuclear reactor as the heat source. 
The methane reforming method consists of breaking the 
link between the carbon and the hydrogen in the methane, 
with the help of heat and water vapor, this causes the 
carbon to oxidize generating carbon dioxide and hydrogen. 
The methane reforming process is the following: 
natural gas is injected and passes through a desulfurizer to 
reduce the production of SOx, once reduced the level of 
sulfur in the natural gas, it is mixed with superheated 
water vapor and enters the reformer where carbon 
monoxide and hydrogen are produced. More water is 
added to the resulting mixture to generate more hydrogen 
and generate carbon dioxide, which is less contaminating 
than carbon monoxide; this reaction takes place in a shift 
reactor. The process is shown in Figure 4. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4  
 
 
A diagram was constructed on the basis of available 
information about the coupling of the HTTR and the 
steam methane reforming plant 
 
 
 
III. ACCIDENT SEQUENCES 
With help from HAZOP several events were chosen 
which were deemed as possible to lead to public health 
effects. [6]  The initiating events were postulated in the 
reactor as well as in the chemical plant. Three of the 
events chosen were rupture in the methane piping, helium 
pipe rupture and rupture in the primary heat exchanger. 
These failures were postulated in the worst place in order 
to cause the largest damage, without losing the objectivity 
of the analysis. The Monte Carlo method which is 
integrated in SAPHIRE [7] was used for the uncertainty 
analysis. 
 
III.A. Methane Pipe Rupture (RU-ME). 
 
A value of 2.35E-4/año [3] was used for the initiating 
event frequency; this event was chosen due to the fact that 
methane is potentially explosive and could cause 
substantial damage to onsite personnel as well as to the 
general public. 
The event considered is a total break in the methane 
piping in the place that would cause the most damage and 
with the least possibility of preventing the explosion. 
There is a nominal flow of 1400Kg/h that leaks from the 
pipe; the only way to stop the flow is by stopping the 
pump BM01 (see Figure 6). 
 
III.A.1. Location and Description of the Break. 
   
In this event there is a rupture in the methane pipe as 
shown in Figure 6; it is located between the evaporator 
EM01 and the pressure control valve VCPM02. When a 
pressure difference is detected, a signal is sent to stop the 
pump BM01, while all the helium from the reactor is sent 
to the PPWC. If for some reason the flow cannot be  
 
 
 
Fig. 5 Coupling of HTTR and Methane Reforming Plant 
 
diverted or a SCRAM must be initiated, the PPWC is 
designed to dissipate the 30 MW from the reactor. 
If there is a SCRAM, the MCS stops and the ACS and the 
VCS start, which remove the decay heat from the reactor. 
 
Fig 6. Location of Methane Pipe Break. 
 
III.A.2. Results for the Initiating Event RU-ME. 
 
Figure 7 presents the event tree that was built for this 
initiating event using the computer program, SAPHIRE, 
developed by the INEEL[7].  
 
 
Fig 7. Event Tree for the initiating event RU-ME. 
 
Table I presents the definition of the possible end 
states for the event tree presented in Figure 6. Although 
the last two of the end states do not cause health effects, 
they are considered due to the economic effect that they 
imply due to plant damage. 
 
TABLE I. End States for Initiating Event RU-ME 
EXPLOSIONM1 The methane supply is not closed 
DTP Partial thermal damage to the reactor 
                                                          
1 The quantity of gas accumulated will depend on the time 
to repair the pump BM01, 10 minutes were calculated to 
be able to accumulate 233.33Kg of methane, if it were to 
burn it could cause second degree burns after 20 seconds 
of exposition to people located 100 meters from the center 
of the fire.  
 
due to the fact that the reactor was 
shutdown but no cooling was 
available. 
DTQ Thermal damage to the chemical 
plant, in particular where the helium 
of the secondary circuit is in contact 
with the reformer; given that there is 
no methane flow, the reformer pipes 
heat up. 
 
Fault trees were constructed to be able to calculate 
the frequencies of the sequences, one for each mitigating 
system shown in the headings of the event trees. The level 
of detail in the fault trees reached the components, 
considering their power supply as the support system; 
other support systems were not considered due to the lack 
of detailed enough information. The failure of the power 
supply as an initiating event will be analyzed in a future 
study. 
The fault trees are not presented in this paper, they 
can be found in the report [8]. The fault trees were built 
and quantified with SAPHIRE also. The failure rates for 
each component were obtained from various references, 
including the PRA Procedures Guide [4] and the Guide 
for reliability data in the process industry [3]. Data for the 
failure of the operator to shut down the reactor and the 
failure of the insertion of the control rods were taken from 
the report on the operational experience in Fort St. Vrain, 
a High Temperature Gas Cooled reactor that operated in 
the United Status for ten years [5].  
Once evaluated the fault trees, the probability of 
failure of each system was calculated; Table II shows the 
results of the failure probability for each system involved 
in the event tree for the initiating event RU-ME. 
 
TABLE II. System Failure Probabilities for RU-ME 
System Failure Probability 
VCS 9.84 x 10-3
ACS 6.59 x 10-3
DESV 2.54 x 10-4 
META 2.53 x 10-4 
APAG 5.10 x 10-6 
 
 
Once the fault trees were evaluated, the frequencies of the 
accident sequences were quantified. The sequences were 
grouped by end states in order to evaluate the frequencies 
of the possible consequences for this event. The results 
for all the end states considered in this paper are shown in 
Table V. In particular, the results for this event tree show 
a mean frequency of 6.53 x 10-8 for a methane explosion, 
2.60 x 10-7 for DTP, and 3.15 x 10-13 for DTQ.  
 
III.B. Helium Pipe Rupture (RU-HE) 
 
This event is considered the worst event by the 
HTTR designers, and is referred to as a depressurization 
accident. It consists of a total rupture of the coaxial pipe 
that goes to the PPWC and the heat exchanger (IHX). 
This break could cause the coolant to leave the 
pressurized vessel and leave the reactor without coolant, 
in Duch a way that the ACS would not be available and 
the only way to remove the dacay heat is with the VCS. 
 
III.B.1. Location and Description of the Helium Pipe 
Break. 
 
A frequency of 2.12E-5/year is considered for this 
large break [7] and it is localized in the outlet of the 
pressurized vessel, as illustrated in Figure 9. When the 
pressure difference is detected, a SCRAM occurs, the 
coolant is released to the containment. The containment 
isolation valves must close to avoid liberation of fission 
products, although a small quantity may leak to the 
atmosphere through the service area due to the increase in 
the containment pressure. The ACS cannot operate under 
these conditions to prevent the entrance of air into the 
core. The decay heat is removed by radiation by the VCS. 
When the pressure inside the core and the mixture of 
helium/air is the same, air may enter by natural 
convection and oxidize the graphite structures until the 
VCS cools the reactor and the oxidation reaction stops. 
 
 
 
Fig 9. Location of the Helium Pipe Break RU-HE. 
 
 
III.B.2. Results for Helium Pipe Rupture RU-HE. 
 
By failing the mitigating systems that could enter to 
avoid possible accident consequences, it was possible to 
create the event tree presented in Figure 10. The system 
entitled CV_VALVE, the containment isolation valve, 
avoids the liberation of fission products out of the vessel 
containment. The end states for this initiating event are 
shown in Table III. 
 
 
Fig 10. Event Tree for the Initiating Event RU-HE. 
 
TABLE III. End States for Helium Pipe Break 
DTP Partial thermal damage, given that the reactor 
is shut down, the reactor is will be cooled by 
natural convestion. 
FP Fission Product release through the service 
area. 
DT Thermal damage, the reactor was not shut 
down, por lo tanto, no se activa el VCS, 
  
  
*El daño se debe sobre todo al encamisado del 
combustible y es parcial debido a que se logra a pagar el 
reactor pero se enfría por convección natural, debido a 
que ningún sistema de enfriamiento logró entrar. 
**Las fuentes de FP consideradas en el análisis son: FP 
contenidos en el refrigerante primario, FP que cubren la 
superficie interna del sistema primario de enfriamiento y 
FP contenidos en el núcleo (combustible) los cuales son 
liberados adicionalmente durante el accidente. 
***El diseño del reactor HTTR tiene una 
retroalimentación negativa debido al efecto Doppler del 
combustible, logrando alcanzar 1600ºC como temperatura 
máxima. 
 
The probabilities for the systems are shown in TABLE V. 
 
TABLE V. System Failure Probabilities 
System Failure Probability 
VCS 9.84 x 10-3
AGUA-PPWC 4.47 x 10-3
CV-VALV 2.83 x 10-4
APAG 5.10 x 10-6
 
The system CV-VALV is responsible for the closure of 
the isolation valve to avoid fision product release. Since 
the frequency of this initiating event is 2.12x10-5/year2,      
even if the probability of failure of CV-VALV were large, 
                                                          
2 This value is conservative since the value for a large 
LOCA was assumed, given no data was found for breaks 
of concentric pipes. 
the end state is for FP is 6 x 10-9/year, as can be seen in 
Table VI. 
 
II.C. Rupture of a pipe in the PPWC (RU-PPWC). 
 
This initiating event is assumed to have a frequency 
of 5E-4/year [4] and is considered important because if a 
large amount of water were to enter into the reactor, first 
there is a probability that the internal graphite structures 
could be oxidized and if the reactor is not shut down, 
hydrogen would be produced in the core, possibly 
resulting in an explosion. 
 
III.C.1. Location and Description of the Event RU-PPWC. 
 
In the case of a break in a heat exchanger pipe inside 
the PPWC (see Figure 11), the pressurized water could 
enter into the primary helium loop and if so would 
evaporate given the  heat of the structures in the reactor. 
The water that enters inside the core would cause 
oxidation of the graphite, as well as increase the 
reactivity. A SCRAM occurs when the a decrease is 
detected in the pressure between the primary helium gas 
and the pressurized water. Simultaneously, the PPWC is 
isolated from the water pump by closing an isolation 
valve to prevent an even greater ingress of water into the 
reactor core. 
 
Fig 11. Location of the break RU-PPWC. 
III.C.2. Results for the Event RU-PPWC. 
 
The Event Tree was developed for the PPWC heat 
exchanger pipe break and is presented in the Figure 12, 
and the end states are shown in Table V. 
 
 
 
Figura 12. Árbol de eventos para el evento iniciador RU-
PPWC 
 
TABLE V. End States for RU-PPWC 
DTP Partial thermal damage to the 
reactor due to the fact that the 
reactor was shutdown but no 
cooling was available. 
OXGRAF This refers to the oxidation of the 
graphite given the ingress of water 
into the reactor. 
EXPLOSIONH2 Given the accumulation of  
EXPLOSIONH2-FP  
 
 
IV. General Results 
 
Table I shows the failure probability of each system and 
Table II shows the frequency of each end state in 
descending order. The point value, mean, 5% and 95% 
values are shown here as calculated in the ucertainty 
analysis. 
 
 
TABLE I. Probability of System Failure. 
 
 
 
TABLE II. End State Frequency . 
 
 
 
From Table I we can observe that the system with the 
gratest failure probability is the VCS. Although the VCS 
has the largest failure probability, it is not the system that 
contributes most to the end state frequency. The system 
that contributes most is to an accident that affects health is 
the system META. The failure or success of the system 
VCS affects the economic study more than the health risk. 
In Table II we can observe that the end state with the 
highest frequency is OXGRAF, which refers to the 
oxidation of the internal graphit structures in the reactor 
pressure vessel. Because this analysis focused in on public 
safety, for this reason only these events were analyzed; 
however, more events are to be analyzed in future work to 
provide a more solid basis for design modifications.  
Observing Table II we find three end states that 
provoke damage to the onsite, and possibly offsite, 
population: EXPLOSIONM, EXPLOSIONH2, FP and 
these same ocurrences but with different extensions 
added, such as DT, DTP, DTQ.  
 
 
TABLE III Frequency of End States that Affect Health 
 
 
 
Table III shows only the end states that could have an 
effect on the population in terms of death and injury. The 
mean frequency is 6.991E-8/año. 
 
V. IMPORTANCE AND SENSITIVITY STUDIES 
 
The mean frequency of this end state is 6.6E-8/year, 
if it were necessary to reduce this frequency, it is possible 
to rank the importance of the components that are 
involved in these sequences. It was found that the 
methane pump BM01 contributes most to this frequency, 
since the failure to stop this pump results in an 
accumulation of methane at the place of the break. Given 
the design3, there is no way to stop the methane flow if 
the pump is not stopped. For this reason, several 
modifications were suggested to study their impact on the 
end state frequency. One suggestion was to place a cutoff 
valve before the evaporator, shown as VCM-A in Figure 
7. The other was to observe the failure probability of the 
pump necessary to achieve a risk reduction comparable to 
that achieved with the addition of the new valve. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Cutoff valve VCM-A added to design 
 
The results show that the new cutoff valve reduces 
the end state frequency from 6.5E-8/year to 1.4E-10/year. 
In order to achieve this same reduction in frequency of the 
methane explosion end state, it would be necessary to 
decrease the failure probability of the pump from 2.78E-4 
to 6E-7, which falls outside the 90% range of certainty 
considered in this study. 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In general the system with the largest failure probability is 
VCS with a mean value of  9.8 x 10-3. The system with 
the lowest failure probability is the shutdown system, 
APAG, with a mean value of 5 x 10-6. 
                                                          
3 We must iterate that this reflects the results based on the 
design presented here, and may not reflect the real design. 
The end state with the largest frequency is graphite 
oxidation with a mean value of 2.20 x 10-6/año; although 
this was the end state with the largest frequency  and 
contributes    % to the total accident frequency, it is a 
small frequency when compared to the frequency of core 
melt of a BWR, in the range of 10-6 to 10-5/year. 
This end state affects the economic part of the damage 
and will be used to do future analysis for definig design 
changes. The frequency of events that would have an 
affect on the population, onsite and possible offsite 4E-
9/año a 2.4E-7/año; where the most frequent end state is 
the methane explosion 3.806E-9/año a 2.475E-7/año. The 
next most frequent end state is that of fission product 
release with a mean value of 4.056E-10/año a 2.095E-8 
and finally the least frequent is that involving the 
hydrogen explosion in the reactor vessel with a mean 
value of 5.541E-13/año a 4.268E-11/año. 
Although generic failure rates were employed, and 
when the data did not exist, conservative values were 
used,  the end state frequencies were small. Although the 
the analysis is simplified, if other factors were to be 
considered, such as taking credit for human actions, 
component repair, etc, further reduction in frequencies 
would be expected. More plant specifc data and or data 
with less uncertainty could help to refine the analysis. 
Future work includes more sensitivity studies in order 
to determine the impact of possible modifications in the 
design and operation of the plant.  For example, 
sensitivity tests could be done on the first event, which 
resulted in the dominant frequncy, that is, calculate the 
risk reduction by adding a cutoff valve in the methane 
pipe. If the sensitivity study results in important risk 
reduction, the next step is to evaluate the cost of the 
modification and present the cost/benefit or value/impact 
results as a piece of information important to consider in 
the decision making process.  
Another part of future work involves considering the 
initiating event, loss of offsite power, dominant in BWRs, 
but is proving to be much less so in HTGRs.. 
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